Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The Right to Refuse to Work Under Hazardous Conditions by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1979 
Issue 2 Symposium: The Quest for Equality (Part II) 
January 1979 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The Right to Refuse 
to Work Under Hazardous Conditions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The Right to Refuse to Work Under Hazardous Conditions, 
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 571 (1979). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF
1970: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO WORK
UNDER HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing public concern with environmental pollution' and indus-
trial safety and health2 during the 1960's led to heightened congres-
sional awareness of inadequate federal regulation of the employment
environment.3 Congress initially responded by passing several special-
ized safety and health statutes applicable to particular employees or
industries.4 A disastrous coal mine explosion in 19681 and increased
1. Environmental concern with regulatory programs at the federal level first manifested it-
self in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
2. By 1970, 14,500 persons were killed annually from industrial accidents, and a reported
2.2 million workers per year suffered disabling injuries in the workplace. Moreover, the rate of
industrial accidents, measured in terms of the number of disabling injuries per million worker
hours, increased 20% between 1958 and 1970. In addition, the Public Health Service estimates
that 390,000 new occurrences of occupational disease are detected each year. S. REP. No. 1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178-79. A
study commissioned by the federal government concludes that 25 million deaths and serious inju-
ries go unreported every year for lack of adequate reporting techniques. Cohen, OSHA and the
W orkplaCe Environment." An Unfufihled Promise, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 214 (D. Raff ed. 1975).
The economic cost of industrial accidents is also substantial. The annual loss to the economy is
more than $8 billion, $1.5 billion of which represents lost wages. The loss of work caused by
industrial accidents is ten times greater than the loss caused by strikes. 116 CONG. REC. 38713
(1970); see S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5178.
3. In 1713 Bernardino Ramazzini, the "father of occupational safety and health," described
the adverse effects of an unhealthy workplace in Diseases of Workers. Not until the twentieth
century, however, were effective steps taken to improve the industrial environment in the United
States. For an historical overview of the law of occupational safety and health, see J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIAN, BITER WAGES, chs. 3-5 (1973). See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH LAW (1978).
4. The McNamara-O'Hara Public Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358
(1976), required suppliers of governmental services to comply with safety and health guidelines.
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1976),
conditioned the receipt of federal funds on the maintenance of safe working conditions. The
Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-740 (1976) (repealed 1977),
established safety and health standards for segments of the mining industry. Except for the Metal
and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, which has been incorporated into the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1976) (amended 1977), the safety and health
standards of these statutes have been superseded by the standards established under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) (amended 1978). The enforce-
ment and penalty provisions of these acts, however, remain operative. See Martin, OSH4: .4 New
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pressure from organized labor6 later set the impetus for the first com-
prehensive job safety and health reform legislation, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act).7
The Act seeks "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to pre-
serve our human resources."' Employers must comply with specific
safety and health standards promulgated under the Act, and when no
specific standard is applicable, the employer has a general duty to fur-
nish his employees with a place of employment free from recognized
hazards that may cause death or serious physical harm.9
The Act also provides employees with numerous rights intended to
advance their health and safety, 10 including rights to request an OSHA
inspection of the workplace, I to "walkaround" with an OSHA inspec-
tor during an inspection,' 2 and to exercise their rights without recrimi-
Era in Safety Concern, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1973: PROCEEDINGS OF NINETEENTH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 139 (V. Randall ed. 1973).
5. The explosion, in Farmington, West Virginia, killed 78 miners. See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS
IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 46 (1976); M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note
3, at 4.
6. Organized labor has become increasingly concerned with the health and safety of work-
ers. Historically, union leaders concentrated more heavily on obtaining economic concessions
from management than on improving health and safety conditions. See N. ASHFORD, supra note
5, at 30-31, 492-93. By 1966, however, when health and safety were mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, the condition of the work environment
became an important pawn in the labor-management power struggle. Id Compare NLRB v.
Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967), with NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958). Consequently, employee interest groups lobbied for a strong federal law
when Congress considered the Act. 116 CONG. REc. 38713 (1970).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) (amended 1978). Many courts and commentators use the
acronym "OSHA" to refer to both the Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, the agency within the Department of Labor responsible for administering the Act. For the
purpose of clarity in this Note, "Act" will refer to Occupational Safety and Health Act, and
"OSHA" will denote the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
8. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
9. Id. § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976); see Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707,
709 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978); Ace Sheeting & Repair Co. v. OSHRC, 555
F.2d 439, 440 (5th Cir. 1977); N. ASHFORD, supra note 5, at 143-44.
10. For a general discussion of employees' rights under the Act, see N. ASHFORD, supra note
5, at 150-52, 163-65; Cohen, Employee Rights and Responsibilities Under OSH4, in OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 135 (1978).
II. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976).
12. Id. § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1976), reads in part: "[A] representative of the employer
and a representative authorized by his employees shall be given an opportunity to accompany the
Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection of any workplace ... for
the purpose of aiding such inspection."
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nation by their employers. 3
Perhaps the most fundamental of employee rights is one whose exist-
ence has yet to be definitively settled"4-- an employee's right to refuse
to work under hazardous conditions yet retain the Act's protection
from discharge or discrimination. This Note argues that the judiciary
should recognize an implied right to refuse hazardous work in light of
the Act's legislative history, the implications of preexisting labor law,
and the practical and policy considerations supporting this conclusion.
II. AN IMPLIED RIGHT TO REFUSE TO WORK UNDER HAZARDOUS
CONDITIONS
Pursuant to his authority to promulgate regulations under the Act, 5
13. Id § ll(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted anypro-
ceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding or because ofthe exercise by such employee on behalfofhimself or others of any
right afforded by this chapter.
Id (emphasis added). Section 1 1(c)(2) describes the implementation procedure for the antidis-
crimination provision of § 8(c)(1):
Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated
against by any person in violation of this subsection may, within thirty days after such
violation occurs, file a complaint with the Secretary alleging such discrimination. Upon
receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall cause such investigation to be made as he
deems appropriate. If upon such investigation, the Secretary determines that the provi-
sions of this subsection have been violated, he shall bring an action in any appropriate
United States district court against such person. In any such action the United States
district courts shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain violations of paragraph
(1) of this subsection and order all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement
of the employee to his former position with back pay.
Id. § I 1(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
14. The scope of employee rights under the Act is not well defined for two reasons common
to controversial and complex federal legislation. First, the Act contains several vague and redun-
dant provisions. See N. ASHFORD, supra note 5, at 159-63; M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 8.
Second, the statute is a product of numerous compromises; the House and Senate bills sent to the
Conference Committee alone contained 105 points of disagreement. 116 CONG. REc. 42203
(1970).
15. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657 (g) (1976), states
in part that: "[t]he Secretary. . . shall ... prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out [his] responsibilities under this chapter .... " The Secretary's interpreta-
tion of this Act, and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, must be deferred to if that
interpretation is a reasonable one, even though some other interpretation would be more reason-
able. See Langer Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 524 F.2d 1337, 1338 (7th Cir.
1975); cf. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
880 (1978) (Secretary's interpretation of Act's requirements entitled to "great weight") (citing
Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974)); Budd Co. v. OSHRC,
513 F.2d 201, 205 (3rd Cir. 1975) (court must accord "significant weight" to Secretary's interpreta-
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the Secretary of Labor published regulation 1977.12(b), which inter-
preted section 11(c) of the Act to entail an implied right to refuse to
work: (1) when an employee, in good faith, reasonably concludes that
(a) there is a real danger of death or serious injury and (b) there is
insufficient time to eliminate the danger through regular enforcement
channels, and (2) when the employee is unable to obtain a correction of
the hazardous condition from the employer. 6
The Secretary's interpretation has met with mixed reception by the
tion of statute and regulations promulgated under this chapter). See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 192 (1969) (courts must show great deference to interpretation given to statute by agency
officers, especially when the challenged administrative procedure involves a contemporaneous
construction of a statute by those responsible for setting the statutory machinery into motion);
Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d at 710 (agency's regulation will be upheld so long as it is
"reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation") (quoting Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978) provides:
(a) In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or
testify in proceedings under or related to the Act, section 1 l(c) also protects employees
from discrimination occurring because of the exercise "of any right afforded by this Act."
Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to partici-
pate as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec. 10). Certain other rights exist by neces-
sary implication. For example, employees may request information from the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the ex-
ercise of a right afforded by the Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the
Secretary in the course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be dis-
criminated against because of their cooperation.
(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative history
discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would
entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the work-
place. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be cor-
rected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If corrections are not
accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee will
normally have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to section
8(f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies which have responsibil-
ity in the field of safety and health. Under such circumstance, therefore, an employer
would not ordinarily be in violation of section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an
employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or
health hazards.
(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice
between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death
arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. I/the employee, with no alternative,
refuses in goodfaith to expose himseff to the dangerous condition, he would be protected
against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee's apprehension of
death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circum-
stances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death
or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to
eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addi-
tion, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from
his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
Id. (emphasis added).
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judiciary. The district courts disagree about the validity of regulation
1977.12(b),1 7 and a split among the appellate courts recently arose from
the only two circuit courts that have ruled on the regulation.' 8
A. Judicial Denial of Right to Refuse Hazardous Work
One of the two federal courts of appeals to consider regulation
1977.12(b) held it ultra vires. In Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co.' 9
the Secretary of Labor accused the company of unlawfully discharging
one of its employees in violation of the Act's antidiscrimination provi-
sion.2 The employee, an ironworker required to connect steel beams
150 feet above the ground, came down from his work position with his
crew when they feared that the wind velocity threatened their safety.
When the employee refused to obey the foreman's order to return to
work, he was fired.2'
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that section
1 I(c)(1) does not imply an employee right to refuse to work when faced
with a perilous situation.22 The court reasoned that even though the
Act should be broadly construed to effectuate its legislative purpose of
eliminating unsafe employment conditions, section 8(f)(1) of the stat-
ute23 "clearly provides a[n exclusive] method for dealing with the threat
17. See notes 22, 45 infra.
18. See notes 19-57 infra and accompanying text.
19. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
20. For the text and a discussion of the antidiscrimination provision, see note 13 supra and
accompanying text.
21. 563 F.2d at 710. The construction industry has one of the highest injury rates among the
major occupational trades. Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. Dunlop v. Daniel Constr. Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affdsub nom. Marshall
v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); accord,
Usery v. Certified Welding Corp., 6 O.S.H.C. 1142 (D. Wyo. 1977), af'd sub nom on other
grounds, Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7
O.S.H.C.) 1069 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 1978); Aders v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 76-292-M
(D.N.M. Oct. 13, 1976); Brennan v. Empire-Detroit Steel Div., Detroit Steel Corp., No. C-1-74-
345 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 1976), rev'd sub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th
Cir.), petitionfor cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870); Usery v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1976), rev'dsub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593
F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870);
Brennan v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 5 O.S.H.C. 1049 (S.D. Ohio 1976), appealdismissed, No. 76-2139
(6th Cir. Apr. 1977).
23. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1978) states
in pertinent part:
Any employees or representative of employees who believe that a violation of a safety
or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists,
may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary or his authorized representa-
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of imminent danger through . . . a request for immediate inspec-
tion."24
A divided Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal.25 Relying upon the statutory scheme and the legisla-
tive history of the Act, it concluded that the Secretary of Labor ex-
ceeded his grant of authority under the enabling provision of the
statute.26
The court first found persuasive the presence in the Act of two sec-
tions that explicitly address the problem of imminently dangerous con-
ditions in the workplace:27 section 8(f)(1), which allows employees to
request inspections, 28 and section 13, which permits the Secretary to
petition the district courts to restrain employment conditions that cre-
ate an imminent danger to the safety of employees.29 The court rea-
soned that these sections contain the only procedures that employees
may follow when faced with imminent danger in order to retain the
Act's protection against dismissal. 30
tive of such violation or danger. Any such notice shall be reduced to writing, shall set
forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice, and shall be signed by the
employees or representative of employees .... If upon receipt of such notification the
Secretary determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or dan-
ger exists, he shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this
section as soon as practicable, to determine if such violation or danger exists.
24. 4 O.S.H.C. 1125, 1126 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'dsub nom. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co.,
563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); see Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 5.
25. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
26. 563 F.2d at 710. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
27. 563 F.2d at710-11.
28. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
29. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976) provides:
(a) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction, upon petition of the Sec-
retary, to restrain any conditions or practices in any place of employment which are such
that a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physi-
cal harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated
through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by this chapter...
(b) Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to
grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order pending the outcome of an
enforcement proceeding pursuant to this chapter .... [N]o temporary restraining order
issued without notice shall be effective for a period longer than five days.
(d) If the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously fails to seek relief under this section,
any employee who may be injured by reason of such failure, or the representative of
such employees, might bring an action against the Secretary in the United States district
court. . . for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to seek such an order and for
such further relief as may be appropriate.
30. 563 F.2d at 711.
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The court then examined the legislative history of the Act to support
its conclusion that the Act contains no implied right that allows work-
ers to walk off the job because of unsafe conditions.3 The court relied
upon Congress' consideration and rejection of two provisions in the
House bill: a controversial section that would have permitted employ-
ees to walk off the job with full pay under certain conditions3 2 and a
proposal that would have authorized administratively ordered shut-
downs when imminent danger was present in the workplace.33 The
House subsequently acceded to the Senate's version of these provisions:
a right to request an OSHA inspection rather than a right to strike with
pay, 4 and the vestiture in the district courts of sole authority to enjoin
an employer's business operations.3 -
In a strong dissent, Judge Wisdom found unpersuasive the majority's
inference from the legislative history that Congress intended to deny
employees the right to refuse hazardous work.36 He questioned the rel-
evance of the two deleted provisions to the regulation at issue, arguing
that neither of the provisions paralleled the right embodied in regula-
tion 1977.12(b). 37 He also offered two justifications for upholding the
Secretary's interpretation of the antidiscrimination provision. First, the
regulation comprehends "one of the 'other rights' mentioned in
1 l(c)(1), a right to safe conditions implicit in the entire law."3 Second,
the regulation represents an "essential part of the employee enforce-
ment envisioned by Congress" and protected by § 1 l(c)(1)., 9 The em-
ployee plays an important role in the Act's enforcement because of the
limited manpower available for inspections.4" The right to refuse un-
31. Id. at 712.
32. Id.; 116 CONG. REC. 38369, 38377-78, 38723.
33. 563 F.2d at 713-15; 116 CONG. REC. 37338, 38369, 38372, 38378-79, 38713, 42201, 42203
(1970).
34. 563 F.2d at 713; H.R. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970), reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5234; see note 23 supra.
35. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
36. 563 F.2d at 719 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9.
37. 563 F.2d at 719-20 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 718. Section 1 l(c)(1) of the Act does not contain the phrase "other rights," but
speaks of "any right afforded by this chapter." Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
§ ll(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 660(cXl) (1976).
39. 563 F.2d at 718 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
40. 563 F.2d at 718 n.5 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); see S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5187-89; 116 CONG. REC. 38386
(1970); ef. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972) (employee participation in enforcement of
National Labor Relations Act); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772
Number 2]
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safe work increases the incentive for employees to invoke the protec-
tion of the Act4" and helps to ensure the employee's availability for
assistance in OSHA investigations.42 Judge Wisdom thus concluded
that the Secretary's regulation fills a dangerous gap in the Act and is
consistent with the broad remedial purpose of protecting the American
worker.43
B. Judicial Recognition of the Right to Refuse Hazardous Work
In Marshall v. Whiroool Corp.' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously held that regulation 1977.12(b) is consistent with the Act
and its legislative history, and is a valid exercise of the Secretary of
Labor's rulemaking authority.45 The Sixth Circuit thus placed itself
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (employee participation in enforcement of Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health
Act).
In Usery v. Babcock & 907lcox Co. 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the court noted that
Congress expected that employers would voluntarily correct hazardous conditions or temporarily
cease operations in most cases. As a practical matter, however, the court maintained that some
relief must be accorded to employees during the period before statutory enforcement proceedings
can be implemented. Id. at 757, 758 & n.7; 116 CONG. REc. 37341, 37602-04, 38372 (1970); see
notes 143-56 infra and accompanying text.
41. 563 F.2d at 718 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.) (consolidated appeal), petition for cert. flied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826
(U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870),rev' Brennan v. Empire-Detroit Steel Div., Detroit Steel
Corp., No. C-1-74-345 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 1976),and Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30
(N.D. Ohio 1976).
45. Accord, Marshall v. Seaward Constr. Co., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7
O.S.H.C.) 1244 (D.N.H. Mar. 28, 1979); Marshall v. Halliburton Servs., Inc., OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7 O.S.H.C.) 1161 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 27, 1979); Usery v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See generally Brennan v. Alan Wood Steel Co,,
3 O.S.H.C. 1654 (E.D. Pa. 1975), in which an employer fired an employee who refused to work on
a crane that he alleged to be unsafe in a complaint he had filed with OSHA. The employee first
sought relief through grievance proceedings instituted under a collective bargaining agreement.
An arbitrator held that the employee had wrongfully refused to work on the crane, but ordered
reinstatement without back wages. The Secretary of Labor then sought under § 1 1(c) of the Act to
procure for the employee accumulated seniority and back pay in addition to his reinstatement. A
federal district court rejected the employer's argument that the Secretary must defer to the arbitra-
tor's decision and held that OSHA deferral to arbitration is within the Secretary's discretionary
powers. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18 (1978).
In its subsequent disposition of the case, Usery v. Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 74-1810, 4
O.S.H.C. 1598 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court apparently recognized a right of employees to refuse to
perform hazardous duties under § I l(c) of the Act when the work is unsafe in fact. This right
must be contrasted with regulation 1977.12(b), in which a reasonable belief of danger may invoke
the protection of the Act. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 136-37 infra
and accompanying text.
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"squarely in conflict with. the Fifth Circuit" 46 in Daniel Construc-
tion.47
The Whirlpool court consolidated appeals from two district courts
that had invalidated the Secretary's regulation.48 In one of the cases 49
two maintenance employees refused to perform their duty of cleaning a
guard screen suspended twenty feet above the plant floor. Another
maintenance worker had fallen to his death while cleaning the screen
two weeks before this refusal. After the accident occurred, OSHA in-
spected the plant, issued a citation for a serious violation of the general
duty clause of the Act, and ordered immediate abatement and a $600
penalty.50 The employer partially replaced the inadequate screen and
46. 593 F.2d at 736.
47. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
48. Brennan v. Empire-Detroit Steel Div., Detroit Steel Corp., No. C-1-74-345 (S.D. Ohio
June 25, 1976), rev'd sub nom Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), peltion for
cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870) and Usery v. Whirlpool Corp.,
416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1976),rev'dsub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th
Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870).
In Usery the lower court explicitly found that the regulation had been violated, but invalidated
the regulation as "clearly inconsistent" with the Act. See notes 49-54 infra and accompanying
text. In Brennan the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The attorneys in that suit entered into a pretrial agreement that the disposi-
tion of a pending motion to dismiss in Brennan v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 5 O.S.H.C. 1049 (S.D.
Ohio 1976), appeal disrmissed, No. 76-2139 (6th Cir. Apr. 1977), would be dispositive of the instant
case if decided favorably to the employer. The court in Diamondlnt'l Corp. subsequently granted
the employer's motion to dismiss.
49. Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1976), rev'dsub nom. Marshall v.
Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26,
1979) (No. 78-1870).
50. Id.
The general duty clause is contained in § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976). See note 9 supra and
accompanying text.
Penalties may be assessed for nonserious, serious, and willful violations of the Act. An em-
ployer cited for a nonserious violation-i.e., when an accident or illness resulting from a violation
ordinarily would not cause death or serious physical harm, but would have a direct or immediate
relationship to the safety or health of employees-may incur a civil penalty of up to $1,000. A
serious violation occurs when a substantial probability exists that the cited condition would result
in death or serious physical harm. Fines of $1,000 may be levied for serious violations, although
this amount may be adjusted downward by no more than $500, based on considerations of the
employer's good faith, business size, and history of violations. An employer commits a willful
violation when he intentionally and knowingly violates the Act, or when he knows of a hazardous
condition and makes no reasonable effort to eliminate it. Penalties of up to $10,000 may be as-
sessed against employers for a willful violation. When a willful violation causes the death of an
employee, however,the employer is also subject to six months imprisonment. The fine can be
increased to $20,000 and/or imprisonment for one year upon a subsequent violation. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
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contested the citation before the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (OSHRC)5' at the time the two employees refused to
perform the cleaning operation.
The district court initially concluded that under regulation
1977.12(b) the employees justifiably refused to clean the screen.5 2 The
court found that the job presented a danger of death or serious bodily
harm, and that the refusal to perform the task resulted from a genuine
fear of death or serious bodily harm. Embracing reasoning analogous
to that of Daniel Construction,3 the court, nevertheless, invalidated the
regulation as "clearly inconsistent" with the Act because Congress
"squarely faced the issue as to whether or not employees should be
permitted to leave the job when faced with a dangerous situation and
decided that they should not."54
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 55 After reviewing the
legislative history, the court concluded that the remedial nature of the
Act requires deference to the Secretary's rulemaking authority,5 6 and
that regulation 1977.12(b) is consistent with the congressional purpose
to protect worker safety. 7
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because the Act does not explicitly confer on employees the right to
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (CCH) 57-61,
83-85 (1974).
From July 1972 through December 1974, 98.53% of the 591,160 violations cited by OSHA were
classified as nonserious, resulting in an average fine of $14.99. During the same period, 1.22% of
the cited violations were serious and .25% were willful, with mean fines of $618.66 and $866.44,
respectively. Barnum & Gleason, A PenaltySystem to Discourage OSH.4 Violations, 99 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 30 (Apr. 1976).
51. OSHRC, established under § 12 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976) (amended 1978), is an
independent agency empowered to conduct adjudicatory hearings in accordance with the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. Cofisisting of three members appointed by the President, OSHRC rules
on actions initiated by OSHA or the Secretary of Labor that are contested by employers or em-
ployees. The Commission is the "final arbiter of penalties if the Secretary's proposals are con-
tested and. . . in such a case, the Secretary's proposals merely become advisory." Brennan v.
OSHRC, 487 F.2d 438,442 (8th Cir. 1973); accord, California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC,
517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975); see N. ASHFORD, supra note 5, at 144-45, 171-72; Martin, supra
note 4, at 143-44.
52. 416 F. Supp. at 33.
53. See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
54. 416 F. Supp. at 33.
55. 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 721-26.
57. Id. at 736.
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refuse hazardous work, courts have looked readily to the legislative his-
tory for guidance. The only two courts of appeals that have ruled on.
the existence of this right, however, have split on the issue. Each fo-
cused on the legislative history of the Act, but derived opposite conclu-
sions from Congress' consideration and rejection of two provisions:
one provision would have permitted employees to "strike with pay";
the other would have authorized the issuance of administrative orders
to temporarily restrain an employer's operations.
A. "Strike With Pay" Rejected
When the House Committee on Education and Labor first reported
out an occupational safety and health bill sponsored by Representative
Daniels, the bill contained a section permitting employees to leave the
workplace because of dangerous conditions without loss of compensa-
tion.- The controversial section, which became known as the "strike
with pay" provision, was located in a part of the bill that regulated
employee exposure to toxic substances-an area concerned with the
health of workers rather than with specific safety hazards.59 Under this
bill an employee could be exposed to potentially harmful toxicity levels
only if the employer instituted specified protective measures within
sixty days of an HEW determination of the toxicity of materials in the
workplace.6" If the employer did not take these precautions, however,
58. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(a)(5) (1970), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 38369, 38377-78 (1970); see 416 F. Supp. at 33.
59. [H]ealth hazards include toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and dusts, often in combi-
nation with noise, heat, and other forms of stress. Other health hazards include physical
biological agents. The interaction of health hazards and human organism can occur
either through the senses, by absorption through the skin, by intake into the digestive
tract via the mouth, or by inhalation into the lungs. The results of these interactions can
be respiratory disease, heart disease, cancer, neurological disorder, systemic poisoning,
or a shortening of life expectancy due to general physiological deterioration. The disease
or sickness can be acute or chronic, can require a long latency period even if the original
exposure is brief, and can be difficult or impossible to diagnose early or with certainty.
N. ASHFORD, supra note 5, at 9.
Safety hazards are those aspects of work environments which can cause bums, electri-
cal shock, cuts, bruises, sprains, broken bones, or the loss of limbs, eyesight, or hearing.
In general, the harm is usually of an immediate and sometimes violent nature, is very
often associated with industrial equipment or the physical environment, and often in-
volves an employment task that requires care and training. [There has been an] alarm-
ing increase in such injuries over the past decade.
Id. at 8-9. Because of the more spectacular nature of occupational safety hazards, the occupa-
tional health area has been relatively neglected in terms of education, enforcement, and legislative
remedies. d. at 9-10, 24-25; Cohen, supra note 2, at 215-16.
60. These measures entailed employee education of hazards, including appropriate symp-
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an employee still could be subjected to toxic concentrations if he were
permitted to "absent himself from such risk of harm for the period nec-
essary to avoid such danger without loss of regular compensation for
such period."61
The committee bill faced stiff resistance on the floor of the House,
primarily from members of the Republican party. Representative Stei-
ger of Wisconsin, an outspoken opponent of the committee bill, intro-
duced a substitute bill on the House floor, which would not permit
workers to absent themselves from a dangerous condition without loss
of pay.62 Seeking bipartisan support for the committee bill, Represen-
tative Daniels offered a series of floor amendments that would have
brought the committee bill closer to the Steiger substitute.63 One
amendment would have strengthened the enforcement mechanism by
allowing employees to request a special inspection of the premises
when threatened by imminently dangerous safety violations 4.6  Daniels'
proposed amendment was never acted upon, however, and the House
adopted the Steiger substitute, which contained neither a "strike with
pay" provision nor a provision permitting employees to request an im-
mediate inspection of the workplace. 5
When the Senate considered its version of an occupational safety and
health bill, the sponsor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
Bill, 66 Senator Williams, advised that the bill did not contain a so-
called "strike with pay" provision.6 1 In lieu of this provision, the corn-
toms of illnesses and precautions, provisiort of warning labels, and provision of effective protective
equipment. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(a)(5) (1970), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 1291,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).
61. Id.
62. The Steiger substitute bill, H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), received strong sup-
port from employer-interest groups. 116 CONG. REc. 383713 (1970).
63. Id. at 38372, 38377-78. Refering to the "strike with pay" provision, Daniels stated that
the "provision on employees not losing pay was so generally misunderstood that we have decided
to drop it. We have no provision for payment of employees who want to absent themselves from
risk of harm." Id. at 38377-78.
64. IM.
65. Id. at 38369-70, 38714-15, 38723-24.
66. S. 2192, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), discussedin S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177.
67. mhe committee bill does not contain a so-called strike-pay provision. Rather than
raising a possibility for endless disputes over whether employees were entitled to walk off
the job with full pay, it was decided in committee to enhance the prospects of compliance
by the employer through such means as giving the employees the right to request a spe-
cial Labor Department investigation or inspection.




mittee bill, which the Senate ultimately passed, conferred on employees
the right to request an immediate inspection when they believed that an
imminently dangerous condition existed at the workplace.68
In conference committee, the House receded from its position on this
item; the Senate's provision granting employees the right to request in-
spections prevailed. 69 This series of events gives rise to several persua-
sive arguments in support of the view of the legislative history
advanced in the Daniel Construction dissent and the Whirlpool opinion.
Because the so-called "strike with pay" provision pertained only to the
regulation of toxic substances, 70 Congress' rejection of the provision
does not necessarily amount to a rejection of the Secretary's interpre-
tive regulation, which is directed primarily to the prevention of injuries
arising from immediate safety hazards rather than from health hazards
caused by toxic concentrations. The Fifth Circuit in Daniel Construc-
tion recognized that the "strike with pay" proposal addressed health
rather than safety conditions, 71 but insisted that rejection of this propo-
sal demonstrated a congressional fear that workers might abuse this
right by disrupting their employer's business.72 Although this may be
true of a right that permits employees to stop working without loss of
compensation, the court's analysis lacks merit when applied to a regu-
lation that does not provide compensation to employees who refuse to
work. Workers who do not receive compensation for unperformed
work have less bargaining power and greater incentive to continue
work than do workers who face a loss of wages if they cease to work.7 3
The rights granted to workers under the "strike with pay" provision
68. Id.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5177, 5234. This provision rests now in § 8(0(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1)
(1976), and is substantially reprinted in note 23 supra.
70. The House Committee Report noted that § 19(a)(5) of H.RL 16785 is addressed to
proliferation of carcinogenic and toxic substances in the work environment. H.R. REP. No. 1291,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970).
Only after the Department of Health, Education and Welfare made a determination that
a substance was toxic would employees have a right to information about these sub-
stances, a right to necessary protective equipment, if any. To assure these rights, the bill
guarantees that employees may not be forced to work without these safeguards. There is
still a real danger that an employee may be economically coerced into self-exposure in
order to earn his livelihood, so the bill allows an employee to absent himself from that
specific danger for the period of its duration without loss of pay.
Id. at 30. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
72. 563 F.2d at 714.
73. See notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text.
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also differ markedly from those granted under the Secretary's interpre-
tation of the antidiscrimination provision. The right to "strike with
pay" did not require an immediate danger, and applied only when sixty
days of employer inaction followed a government determination that
toxic levels existed in the workplace.74 Regulation 1977.12(b), in con-
trast, bestows on employees a much more limited right to refuse to
work: the employee must hold a good faith and reasonable belief that
performance of the assigned work would entail a real danger of death
or serious injury; there must be insufficient time to correct the danger
through regular statutory channels; and the employee must have sought
and been unable to obtain a correction from the employer.75
Another crucial feature that distinguishes the Secretary's regulation
from the "strike with pay" provision is the element of compensation.
The requirement that employers pay employees who refuse to work is a
concept alien to labor relations law.76 Indeed, to accept compensation
for work not performed is good cause for discharge.77 Walking off the
job without drawing wages, however, is a traditional means of pro-
testing conditions of employment.78 The regulation, therefore, contains
a right that is distinct from, and much less objectionable than, the
"strike with pay" proposal.
Moreover, the legislative record is silent on the right of employees to
refuse hazardous work without pay-a right that is less open to abuse
than a right to "strike with pay."' 79 The Daniel Construe/ion majority
correctly pointed out Congress' concern with the potential abuses in-
herent in permitting employees to receive compensation while not per-
forming their duties,80 but failed to distinguish the situation in which
74. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(a)(5) (1970), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970); see Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 730 (6th Cir.), petition
for cer. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870).
75. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
76. See Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
77. R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 319 (1976). A single, spontaneous walkout, however, is a presumptively protected activity
under § 7 of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). This action
often represents the "First Fragile Flower of Unionism"-Ze., the genesis of a collective con-
sciousness. See, e.g., Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 79 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1972). Compare Elk
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950),with NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962),and Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 79 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1972),and First
Nat'l Bank, 171 N.L.R.B. 1145, 69 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1968), enforced, 413 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1969).
78. See R. GORMAN, supra note 77, at 318-19.
79. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.




the employee does not receive compensation. The Whirlpool court at-
tached proper weight to this distinction when it noted that, "Congress
was specifically concerned with the monetary incentive that workers
would have by claiming that they believed a situation was hazardous
and then sitting back and collecting their paychecks for doing noth-
ing."8 Because Congress rejected a "strike with pay" provision, but
never considered the quite different right to refuse hazardous work
without pay, the legislative history is not inconsistent with the Secre-
tary's regulation, which contains a limited right of employees to refuse
hazardous work without compensation.8 2
Finally, Congress' replacement of the "strike with pay" provision
with a right to request an immediate inspection 3 does not preclude the
regulation at issue. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the right to request an inspection to be the exclusive
remedy of employees faced with hazardous work. The regulation treats
the right to request an inspection and the right to refuse imminently
dangerous work as complementary; the right to refuse imminently haz-
ardous work may be invoked only when the right to request an inspec-
tion will not adequately further the legislative purpose of protecting the
employee.8 4
B. Administrative Shutdown Rejected
In addition to its rejection of the "strike with pay" provision, Con-
gress rejected a provision that would have permitted the issuance of
administrative orders to shut down an employer's operations when his
employees faced imminent danger. Opponents of the right to refuse
unsafe work argue that this rejection demonstrates a legislative intent
to prohibit employees from refusing to work under hazardous condi-
tions.
Both the House and Senate committee bills initially provided for ad-
ministratively ordered shutdowns of an employer's business operation
in the event of an imminent danger to employees. In the House, the
Daniels bill permitted an OSHA inspector to issue a shutdown order
81. 593 F.2d at 731. See id. at 730 n.35.
82. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
83. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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effective for up to five days.85 The Steiger bill, however, required the
inspector to petition the Secretary of Labor to seek a court injunction to
restrain conditions or practices that cause imminent danger to employ-
ees.8 6 As with the "strike with pay" provision, Representative Daniels
offered to amend his bill to conform with the Steiger bill's treatment ofimminent-danger closings, 87 but the Steiger bill prevailed in the
House.88
In the Senate, the Williams bill permitted an OSHA inspector to is-
sue a three-day shutdown order when the imminence of the danger
would not allow sufficient time to obtain a court injunction. 89 To pro-
tect against the possibility of abuse, the bill required the inspector to
obtain the concurrence of a regional director in the Department of La-
bor.9" An amendment offered by Senators Schweiker, Dominick, and
85. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 38372, 38379, 38394
(1970).
86. 116 CONG. REC. 38372, 38394 (1970).
87. Id. at 38376, 38378. Representative Daniels explained that he introduced this amend-
ment because:
[Business groups] believe that the power to shut down a plant should not be vested in an
inspector. While there is no documentation for this fear, we recognize that it is very
prevalent. The Courts have shown their capacity to respond quickly in emergency situa-
tions, and we believe that the availability of temporary restraining orders will be suffi-
cient to deal with emergency situations. Under the Federal rules of civil procedure, these
orders can be used ex parte. If the Secretary uses the authority that he is given efficiently
and expeditiously, he should be able to get a Court order within a matter of minutes
rather than hours.
Id. at 38378.
88. 116 CONG. REC. 38723-24 (1970); see note 65 supra and accompanying text.
89. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § ll(b) (1970), discussedin S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5189-90. The Senate bill stated:
If the Secretary determines that the imminence of a danger is such that immediate
action is necessary, and the Secretary determines that there is not sufficient time ... to
seek and obtain a temporary restraining order . . . the Secretary shall issue an order
requiring such steps to be taken as may be necessary to avoid, correct, or remove such
imminent danger and prohibiting the employment or presence of any individual in loca-
tions or under conditions where such imminent danger exists. . . .If the Secretary dele-
gates his authority to issue such an order to close a business or plant, in whole or in
substantial part, he shall provide that such an order may not be issued until the employer
has been notified in writing. . . and the concurrence of an official of the Labor Depart-
ment appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate is first ob-
tained.
S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(b) (1970), quotedin Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d at
720 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
90. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § I l(b)(1970), quotedin Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563
F.2d at 720 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The Senate report explained the rationale for requiring a
concurring judgment: "The committee adopted this qualification in order to meet the concern
expressed by some that it should not be within the sole judgment of a single inspector to determine
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/11
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Saxbe, which would have vested sole authority in the courts to enjoin
business operations, was narrowly defeated in the Senate.9' In confer-
ence committee, however, the Senate acceded to the House provision
that permitted restraining orders to issue only from the judiciary.92
Opponents of regulation 1977.12(b) maintain that Congress could
not have intended to permit employees to effectively shut down their
employers' plants through refusals to work when Congress refused to
grant this authority to OSHA inspectors. Congressional opponents of
the administrative shutdown order, however, expressed four main con-
cerns, none of which precludes the right contained in the interpretive
regulation. First, many opponents believed that due process of law
would be denied to employers if an administrative official could order a
plant to close without judicial process.93 Regulation 1977.12(b), how-
ever, does not raise a due process objection because it relies on the
private action of the employee rather than on governmental action.94
Congressional opponents also expressed concern over the harshness
of economic loss to an employer whose plant is closed down by an
OSHA inspector.95 This concern is misdirected toward a regulation
whether a hazard is so imminent as to warrant interference with a production operation." S. REP.
No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5189-
90.
91. 116 CONG. REC. 37601-05 (1970).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprintedin [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5177, 5236. This provision is now located in § 13 of the Act, which is reproduced in perti-
nent part in note 29 supra.
93. See H.R. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 37338, 37602, 37604,
38372, 38379, 38393, 38713, 42202 (1970). See generally Note, Due Process and Employee Safety:
Conflict in OSH.4 Enforcement Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975). For example, Congressman
Robison remarked:
[T]he Daniels bill would allow an inspector to shut down a plant in certain situations,
without giving the employer the opportunity to be heard on the matter. Such a proce-
dure amounts to a denial of due process as guaranteed by the Constitution. Surely,
a more reasonable approach would be to make available injunctive relief in Federal
court ....
116 CONG. REc. 38713 (1970).
94. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707,720-21 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissent-
mg), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). The majority opinion in Daniel Construction addressed this
response by focusing on the degree of protection that Congress intended to afford the employers,
rather than on due process considerations. By refusing to allow OSHA inspectors to close a
plant's operation, the court argued Congress surely did not intend to give this power to a single
employee. 563 F.2d at 715 n.20. But see notes 95-96 infra and accompanying text.
95. 116 CONG. REc. 37338, 37346, 37602-03, 37621, 37624, 37629, 38378-79, 38713 (1970).
Senator Schweiker, for example, commented during the Senate debate:
[Tihe closing down of an industrial plant is indeed a drastic remedy.... In the aver-
age case where the Department of Labor finds a real imminent danger in a plant, I
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that addresses the individual action of an employee or a small group of
employees: only those workers endangered by a plant operation may
refuse to work, and they may only refuse to do the specific hazardous
task.96 Although the suspension of a specific operation might necessi-
tate the closure of an entire plant or project, it most likely would be a
rare occurrence and of short duration.
A related concern is that workers might abuse their right to seek an
administrative injunction to intimidate their employers and increase
their bargaining leverage. 97 The right recognized in regulation
1977.12(b), however, is subject to numerous conditions that substan-
tially diminish any opportunity for abuse.98 More importantly, because
Congress deleted the "strike with pay" provision, an employee who re-
fuses to work is not entitled to wages; thus, he would not invoke the
regulation unless he actually feared for his safety.
Finally, some legislators expressed uneasiness over the potential
abuse of government power by an OSHA inspector wrongfully influ-
enced by employees. 99 To alleviate this concern, Congress granted the
courts sole authority to enjoin imminent dangers."l° The regulation at
issue does not raise this objection because a private action gives rise to
the protection afforded by the right to refuse hazardous work. '0 ' More-
over, this right is less objectionable than an administrative shutdown
provision because the right is narrowly drawn and is by no means revo-
lutionary to the labor law field; employees already have a limited right
to refuse unsafe work under other federal legislation.10 2
would expect the employer to agree with the Department, and close the plant or the
portion of the plant voluntarily himself. But if there is a difference of opinion between
the Department and the employer, I feel the Department should have to sustain a burden
of proof in persuading a Federal district judge that the closure of the plant is necessary. I
believe that both the Department's side and the employer's side should be heard before
such a drastic step is taken against the will of the employer and throwing employees out
of work.
116 CONG. REC. 37602 (1970). See note 87 supra.
96. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 757 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1976). "There is a
vast amount of difference between shutting down an entire plant and allowing a few employees to
refuse a particular work assignment." Id. at 757; see note 16 supra.
97. See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d at 734 & n.47; Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co.,
563 F.2d at 714; H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970); 116 CoNG. REC. 38393 (1970).
98. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1291,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970); 116 CoNG. REc. 38393-94 (1970). See
also notes 87, 89, 90 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
101. See text accompanying note 94 supra.




A close reading of the legislative history of the Act compels the con-
clusion that the history is not inconsistent with regulation 1977.12(b).
Deletion of the "strike with pay" and administrative shutdown provi-
sions does not preclude an employee, with no other reasonable choice,
from refusing to perform hazardous work. "The Congress that passed
this Act did not intend to put the worker to the choice-his job or his
life."10 3
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREEXISTING LABOR LAW
A. Judicial Construction of Analogous Antidiscrimination Provisions
Several federal courts have interpreted the scope of antidiscrimina-
tion provisions similar to section 1 l(c)(1) of the Act. These decisions
demonstrate a progressive approach to worker safety in marked con-
trast to the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Daniel Construction.
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 19691° is the fed-
eral legislation most analogous to the Act. In Phillips v. Interior Board
of Mine Operations Appeals °5 the District of Columbia Circuit deter-
mined that the Coal Mine Act grants miners the right to refuse to work
under conditions that they believe in good faith to be hazardous. 10 6
The court found that a miner comes within the protection of section
1 10(b)(1),1 ° 7 the Coal Mine Act's antidiscrimination section, when he
notifies his foreman of a suspected safety violation in the mine.' s This
notification, the court reasoned, constitutes the initial stage in two en-
forcement procedures expressly protected by section ! 10(b)(1): notifi-
103. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d at 722 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
104. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1976) (amended 1977).
105. 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (2-1 decision), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
106. 500 F.2d at 780; accord, Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Gallo-
way, Rights and Entitlements of Miners and their Representatives Under the 1977 Amendments, in
FEDERAL REGULATION OF MINE, SAFETY, HEALTH AND RECLAMATION 181 (1978).
107. No person shall discharge or in any other way discriminate against or cause to be
discharged or discriminated against any miner or any authorized representative of min-
ers by reason of the fact that such miner or representative (A) has notified the Secretary
or his authorized representative of any alleged violation or danger, (B) has filed, insti-
tuted, or caused to be filed or instituted anyproceeding under this chapter, or (C) has
testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or en-
forcement of the provisions of the chapter.
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § l10(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1) (1976)
(amended 1977) (emphasis added).
108. 500 F.2d at 778-79. This case overturned an Interior Department rule that miners were
protected from discharge only from the time they instituted a formal complaint with the Secretary
of the Interior or an inspector. See Galloway, supra note 106, at 205-06.
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cation of unsafe conditions to the Secretary of the Interior, and the
institution of proceedings under the Coal Mine Act.' 09 The court also
noted from the legislative history the wide scope of protection intended
by section 1 10(b)(1) and the broad remedial purpose of the Coal Mine
Act.1o
The language of the Occupational Safety and Health Act's antidis-
crimination provision appears to give broader protection to workers
than did the Coal Mine Act's provision at the time Phi/lps was de-
cided. I I'
Congress' amendment of the Coal Mine Act in 19771 2 further sup-
ports the Secretary's interpretation of the Act. The amendment broad-
ened the language of the antidiscrimination section to parallel that in
the Occupational Safety and Health Act." 3 According to the Senate
Committee Report on the 1977 Amendments, the broader language in-
tends to ensure that the antidiscrimination provision will be construed
expansively to continue to give miners the right to refuse hazardous
work. 14 Although the relevant legislative intent regarding a congres-
109. 500 F.2d at 779; see note 107 supra.
110. 500 F.2d at 781-83. Senator Kennedy, in introducing the antidiscrimination provision,
remarked that it should "deter. . . retaliation, and, therefore, encourage miners to bring dangers
and suspected violations to public attention." 115 CONG. REC. 27948 (1960), quotedin 500 F.2d at
782.
111. Compare Occupational Safety and Health Act, § 1 l(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976)
("any proceeding under or related to this chapter") (emphasis added),with Federal Coal Mine and
Safety Act of 1969, § I 10(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1) (1976) (amended 1977) ("any proceeding
under this chapter"). Compare also Occupational Safety and Health Act, § I l(c)(l) ("any right
afforded by this chapter") (emphasis added),with Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, §
S10(b)(1) ("any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of
the chapter").
112. Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, § 201, 30 U.S.C.A. § 815
(Supp. 1979) (amending 30 U.S.C. § 820 (1976)).
113. The revised language now protects miners who file a complaint "under or relatedlo this
chapter, including a complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, or the representative
of the miners at the coal or other mine of an alleged danger of safety or health violation in a coal
or other mine." Id. (emphasis added). The amendment also extended protection to "any right
afforded by this chapter." Id. (emphasis added). See note Ill supra.
114. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1977). The Report of the Senate Committee
on Human Resources provided in pertinent part:
The wording of section [201] is broader than the counterpart language in section 110
of the Coal Act and the Committee intends section [201] to be construed expansively to
assure that miners will not be inhibited in any way in exercising any rights afforded by
the legislation. This section is intended to give miners, their representatives, and appli-
cants, the right to refuse to work in conditions they believe to be unsafe or unhealthful
and to refuse to comply if their employers order them to violate a safety and health
standard promulgated under the law. The committee intends to insure the continuing
[Vol. 1979:571
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sional act is that of the Congress which passed the act and not that of a
more recent Congress," l5 Congress' use of this all-embracing phraseol-
ogy in the Occupational Safety and Health Act represents language
that legislatures generally use to express an intent to extend broad pro-
tection to a particular class of persons.' 1 6
Decisions under two other pieces of federal legislation also rely upon
reasoning supportive of the Secretary's interpretation of the Act. In
NLRB v. Scrivener"7 the Supreme Court held that the antidiscrimina-
tion provision of the National Labor Relations Act"I8 prohibits the dis-
missal of an employee who gave written sworn statements to a Board
field examiner investigating an unfair labor practice charge, even
though the employee had not filed formal charges or given formal testi-
mony as expressly required by the statute." 9 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing for a unanimous Court, determined that the words "to dis-
charge or otherwise discriminate" and the necessity of keeping open the
Board's "channels of information" required a liberal interpretation of
the antidiscrimination provision.' 20
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers another example of an
expansive construction accorded to a provision designed to protect
vitality of the various judicial interpretations of section 110 of the Coal Act which are
consistent with the broad protections of the bill's provisions; See, e.g., Phillivs v. IBM4,
500 F.2d 772; Munsey Y. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202.
Id. at 36.
115. But see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974);
F.H.A. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958).
116. See S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977). In addition, the Sixth Circuit in
Whirlpool attached significance to the absence of controversy over the broader language when
Congress directly considered the right to refuse to work under hazardous conditions in its debate
on the Coal Mine Act Amendments. 593 F.2d at 735-36.
117. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
118. "It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer.., to discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this [Act] .
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
119. 405 U.S. 117 (1972); cf. Sinclair Glass Co. v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1972) (af-
fidavit filed by employee in connection with unfair labor practice charge equivalent to giving
testimony and thus a protected activity); M & S Steel Co. v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1965)
(employer violated antidiscrimination provision by discharging employee for giving statement to
field examiner) (enforcing 148 N.L.R.B. 789, 57 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1964)); NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962) (employee who appeared at a Board hearing but did not testify
protected from discharge). But cf. Hoover Design Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1968)
(employee who threatened to file unfair labor practice charges but had not done so not protected
by antidiscrimination provision).
120. 405 U.S. at 122. See text accompanying note 13 supra for the corresponding antidis-
crimination language in the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
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from discrimination or discharge employees who exercise their
rights.' 2 ' A federal district court held that Title VII's antidiscrimina-
tion provision protected an employee who gathered information for a
complaint through inquiries of the employer's customers. 122 Addition-
ally, the First Circuit held that the language of this provision encom-
passes employees who initiate sex discrimination proceedings before
agencies other than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
or through the use of internal grievance machinery.
12 3
These decisions recognize that employees play a critical role in the
enforcement of federal labor legislation because workers are often in
the best position to detect and report violations of the law. Thus, pro-
tecting workers from employer retaliation ensures their participation in
the overall enforcement mechanism.' 24
Similarly, Congress acknowledged that enforcement of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act required the active participation of em-
ployees. 125  The dissenting opinion in Daniel Construction properly
attached great importance to the necessity of employee enforcement in
its view of regulation 1977.12(b). 26 Unfortunately, the Daniel Con-
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976), states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
122. EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir.
1976). See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977); Smith v.
Columbus Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Jeffries v. Harris County
Community Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
124. See generally note 114 supra.
125. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5177, 5187-89; see 116 CONG. REc. 38366 (1970).
126. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text. On the same theory, another court held
that the protection afforded by the antidiscrimination provision came into play when an employee
retained counsel in connection with an OSHA complaint, even though no complaint had been
filed with the Secretary of Labor, as required by the language of the Act. Dunlop v. Hanover
Shoe Farms, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1241 (M.D. Pa. 1976). In Hanover an employer discharged an em-
ployee who had complained to Legal Services about dangerous conditions of employment and
had retained counsel to help remove the danger. The employer argued that the antidiscrimination
provision of the Act did not apply because the employee had been discharged prior to a complaint
to the Secretary of Labor. The court, however, held that the retention of counsel "was the first
step in his exercise of his right to 'safe and healthful working conditions.'" Id. at 1242. See 29
C.F.R. § 1977.9(c) (1978); note 13 supra; f United States v. Wallace Bros. Mfg. Co., OccUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7 O.S.H.C.) 1022 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1978) (oral complaints
made by employees to employer regarding safety and health matters are protected activities for
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/11
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struction majority overly restricted this function of the antidiscrimina-
tion provision. After conceding that the right to request an inspection
advances a valid informational purpose, the court held that the right to
refuse hazardous work "does not necessarily further the same informa-
tional purposes that the right to request inspections promotes."'127 This
view, however, fails to appreciate that the right to request an inspection
is only one aspect of employee self-help, and more importantly, that
the right to refuse hazardous work is a component of employee en-
forcement fundamental to achievement of the Act's remedial purpose
of attaining a safe workplace for employees. To grant workers the right
to request an inspection but withhold the right to refuse hazardous
work creates an anomaly of Congress' intent concerning the Act.'28
B. The Right to Refuse Unsafe Work Prior to the Act
Before passage of the Act, employees had a limited right to refuse
unsafe work under both statutory authority and arbitration law doc-
trine.'29 The importance of this preexisting right cannot be overstated
which they cannot be discharged or discriminated against); Usery v. Granite-Groves, 5 O.S.H.C.
1935 (D.D.C. 1977) (employee's safety-related complaints to employer, OSHA, and outside agen-
cies constitute protected activity under Act); Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (safety complaint to employer is "related to" Act within meaning of
antidiscrimination provision and, therefore, protected activity). But Sf. Usery v. Certified Welding
Corp., 6 O.S.H.C. 1142 (D. Wyo. 1977) (safety complaint to state job safety enforcement agency
was not complaint "under or related to" Act), a]dsub nom. Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7 O.S.H.C.) 1069 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 1978) (holding
unclear). See also Marshall v. Klug & Smith Co., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (7
O.S.H.C.) 1162 (D.N.D. Mar. 19, 1979) (employees lawfully discharged when, after safety com-
plaint to employer produced no improvement, they disrupted project by taking complaint to other
employees).
127. 563 F.2d at 716.
128. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 268-69 (1976) (regarding legislative history
and statutory construction of statutes generally); United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1968).
129. See generally N. ASHFORD, supra note 5, at 185-201; 1 W. CONNOLLY & D. CROWELL, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT: LAW, PRINCIPLES & PRAC-
TICES (1977); M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 466-68; Ashford & Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions:
Emplqee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act andthe Occupational Safety & Health
Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802 (1977); Brownjohn, Effect of OSZA on Industrial Relations and
Collective Bargaining (pt. 2), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 132 (1976); Cohen, supra note 11; Irving, Effect of OSHA on
Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining (pt. 1), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 123 (1976); Tobin, OSHA, Section 301
and the NLRB: Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Rights, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 837 (1974).
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in interpreting the regulation because it places regulation 1977.12(b)
into the wider context of labor relations law.
Unorganized employees who refuse to perform their employment
duties may be protected from discharge or other detrimental action
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 3 ° Pursuant to sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, an employer commits an unfair labor prac-
tice when he interferes with an employee's section 7 rights.', Section
7, in turn, grants employees the right to engage in concerted activities
for their mutual aid or protection. 3 Although the NLRA is not pri-
marily concerned with occupational safety and health, the refusal of
two or more employees to perform work they believe to be hazardous is
a concerted activity within the meaning of section 7.t33 Thus, workers
may not be discharged for collectively striking to protest safety condi-
tions. In addition, a single employee's efforts to obtain compliance
with safety laws designed to benefit employees may be a protected ac-
tivity under the doctrine of constructive concerted activity. 34
130. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
131. Section 8(a)(1) states that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 17]
of this title. ... Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
132. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
133. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Section 8(a)(i) is violated re-
gardless of whether the employees previously attempted to obtain a correction of the condition
from the employer, the condition is actually shown to be unsafe, or the refusal to work is later
determined to be unreasonable. Cohen, supra note 1I, at 156.
134. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975). The status of con-
structive concerted activity in the federal courts, however, is in doubt. Conpare NLRB v. In-
terboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), with NLRB v. C. & I. Air Conditioning,
Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973). To invoke this doctrine, an employee by his action must benefit
other employees as well as himself, and these employees cannot disclaim his actions. Alleluia
Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975). See Atleson, Threats to Health and
Safetyr Employee Sef-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647 (1975).
This protection may also run to unionized employees who are not covered by an effective collec-
tive bargaining agreement, who have entered an agreement without a no-strike clause, or who are
covered by a contract that excludes health and safety matters from the no-strike clause. When an
effective contract contains a broad, compulsory grievance-arbitration provision, however the
courts generally require employees to pursue their contractual remedies. Thus, a no-strike clause
is implied from a contract that encompasses a broad grievance provision and binding arbitration.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962); Ashford & Katz, supra note 129; Atleson, supra; Cohen, supra note 11. When
a contract includes an express or implied no-strike provision, a presumption of arbitrability exists
for the resolution of safety disputes, although arbitration doctrine permits employees to refuse
work that creates an immediate danger. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 389 U.S. 235 (1970); note 139 infra and
accompanying text.
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Employees who refuse to perform unsafe work also may be protected
by section 502 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 135 Section 502
establishes an exception to the rule that employees covered by an ex-
press or implied no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement
may not strike over safety disputes. To justify a contractually prohib-
ited safety walk-off under section 502, the union must present "ascer-
tainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an
abnormally dangerous condition for work exists."' t36 Employees need
not prove that work conditions were unsafe in fact, but must demon-
strate that their belief of unsafe conditions was amply supported by
ascertainable, objective evidence. 137
Collective bargaining agreements are usually enforced by a binding
arbitration procedure. The common law of arbitration states that when
grievance machinery is available to resolve labor disputes, an employee
ordered to perform unreasonable work must do so, and thereafter file a
grievance.' 38 If the worker reasonably believes, however, that compli-
ance with the order or rule would be illegal or hazardous, he may diso-
bey it. 13 9 Arbitrators utilize a broad range of standards, but generally
require employees to support by competent evidence their belief that
A collective bargaining agreement may stipulate, however, that certain conditions will be
grounds for a safety strike. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1115 (3d
Cir. 1975).
135. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
136. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 386-87 (1974) (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rosenn, J., dissenting)). In comparing regulation
1977.12(b) with § 502, it is interesting to note that the regulation is primarily concerned with the
individual action of employees. See note 96 supra and accompanying text. Section 502 rights are
also probably individual rights, available only to those workers actually threatened by abnormally
dangerous conditions. The extent of these rights, however, has never been decided. Ashford &
Katz, supra note 129, at 807; Ferris, Resolving Safety Disputes: Work or Walk, 26 LAB. L.J. 695
(1975). The regulation requires a reasonable belief in the imminent danger of severe bodily harm
or death, which could not be corrected through ordinary statutory channels in a timely fashion.
See text accompanying note 16. Section 502 requires objective, ascertainable support for a good-
faith belief that conditions are abnormally dangerous, but lacks a requirement of imminence,
threat of death or severe bodily harm, or inadequate statutory mechanisms for neutralizing the
danger. See Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 722 n.16 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Ashford & Katz, supra note 129. The relationship
between § 7 and § 502 of the NLRA is complex and unclear in many areas. See Ashford & Katz,
supra note 129, at 807-08.
137. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
138. N. ASnFORD, supra note 5, at 186.
139. Sperry Rand Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. 709, 711 (1968) (Rohman, Arb.); N. ASHFORD, supra
note 5, at 186.
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unsafe conditions actually existed in the workplace. 140
In short, the right to refuse unsafe work existed in several forms
before passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. When
viewed from this broader perspective of labor law, therefore, regulation
1977.12(b), which embodies a variation of this right, seems consistent
with the pattern of federal supervision. Moreover, the right set forth in
regulation 1977.12(b) provides a valuable addition to the congressional
framework for protecting the safety of American workers."'4 The Act's
protection extends to twenty million more workers than covered under
the NLRA. 142 The rejection of regulation 1977.12(b) by the Daniel
Construction court thus signifies that, at least in the Fifth Circuit, work-
ers who interrupt their work because of unsafe conditions will ironi-
cally receive greater protection under the NLRA than under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, which was specifically designed
by Congress to overcome the inadequacies of preexisting law regarding
worker safety.
V. PRACTICAL REASONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from the language and legislative history of the Act, important
practical reasons and policy considerations support regulation
1977.12(b) as a valid exercise of the Secretary of Labor's power under
the Act.
A primary reason for recognition of a worker's right to refuse haz-
ardous work stems from the delay associated with the Secretary's ob-
taining injunctive relief for imminently dangerous conditions. To
enjoin an imminent danger under the Act, four independent judgments
must be made:
(1) The Secretary must conclude that the worker's notice provides rea-
sonable grounds to believe that an imminent danger exists. (2) An
OSHA inspector must conclude upon inspecting the workplace that the
danger cannot be prevented through normal enforcement procedures but
requires immediate injunctive relief and recommend to the Secretary that
140. Marble Products Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 247 (1963) (Marshall, Arb.); Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 833 (1962) (Bothwell, Arb.); Ferris, supra note 136, at 705-07.
141. See notes 133, 136 supra.
142. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 726 n.23 (6th Cir.), petition for cert.fled, 47
U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870). The NLRA does not apply to supervisors or
agricultural workers. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The Na-





he seek relief. (3) The Secretary must conclude that the inspector is cor-
rect and proceed to federal court. (4) A federal district court must find
that an imminent danger exists at the worksite such that requires immedi-
ate injunctive relief.' 43
This protracted procedure underscores an inherent imbalance in the
Act in the absence of regulation 1977.12(b): an employee must risk
death or serious bodily injury awaiting an injunction, but an employer
risks only a temporary interruption of production.t" If courts continue
to invalidate the regulation, the Act will contain too many postponing
devices to make the injunction a practical alternative for imminently
endangered employees.145
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.'4 6
further intensifies this harshness on employees. In this case the Court
held that section 8(a) of the Act, 147 which authorizes warrantless OSHA
inspections of employer business premises, violates the warrant clause
of the fourth amendment. 4  Accordingly, employers may refuse entry
until the inspector obtains compulsory process, thus, the decision cre-
ates yet another delay in the enjoinment of an imminent danger. 49
Another reason to sustain the Secretary's interpretive regulation is
the inadequacy of the mandamus procedure embodied in the Act. Sec-
tion 13(a) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to petition the federal dis-
143. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 711 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
80 (1978); see notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
144. Wood, Enforcing Job Safeti: A Union View of OSHA, 98 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 39 (Mar.
1975).
145. See Atleson, supra note 134, at 709.
146. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
147. Section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting ap-
propriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized (1) to enter
without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction
site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed. . . and (2) to
inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and
within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment...
and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
148. 436 U.S. at 325. See generaly McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspec-
tions: Is There An, Warrantfor a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 942 (1977).
149. Barlow's will likely affect only the frequency with which employers deny entry to inspec-
tors because even prior to Barlow's an OSHA inspector who was denied entry could gain entry
only by compulsory process. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1978). Barlow's, however, shifts the focus of the
Act from embracing a statutory right of immediate entry-with occasional, and consequently tol-
erable, denial of entry--to a judgment that no statutory right to immediate entry exists absent an
administrative search warrant. 436 U.S. at 329-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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trict courts to restrain conditions that create an imminent danger.150 If
the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously fails to seek relief, any affected
employee may seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to
carry out his duty.'51 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state, how-
ever, that the writ of mandamus has been abolished, 152 and that relief
formerly available through mandamus "may be obtained by appropri-
ate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in
these rules." '53 Thus, a complaint filed by an employee to compel the
Secretary to exercise his authority may be handled as a civil complaint
and placed on the normal civil docket, subject to the usual delay.'5 4
Even if the Act contemplated federal injunctive action against the Sec-
retary when mandamus was appropriate,' 55 this multistep litigation
would afford little relief to an employee facing death or serious physi-
cal harm. 56 In either case, the waiting period is unacceptable on policy
grounds.
Regulation 1977.12(b) was promulgated to alleviate the delay en-
cumbering the imminent-danger remedy. The search warrant require-
ment and the writ of mandamus procedure accentuate the practical
necessity of upholding the regulation. Without the right to refuse haz-
ardous work, the congressional purpose of assuring safe working condi-
tions for employees is not attainable.
VI. CONCLUSION
A majority of the courts that have considered regulation 1977.12(b)
has overly restricted the Act's antidiscrimination provision. This inter-
pretation is neither compelled by the legislative history nor desirable as
a practical matter. On the contrary, the legislative history supports the
right to refuse hazardous work, especially when viewed in the context
of preexisting labor law relating to the issue; moreover, in light of the
inadequacy of previously recognized federal protections, the practical
and policy considerations underlying the Act's purpose warrant judicial
approval of the Secretary of Labor's interpretive regulation.
150. See note 29 supra.
151. Id.
152. FED. R. CIv. P. 81(b).
153. Id.
154. Oldham, O.S.HA. May Not Work in "Imminent Danger" Cases, 60 A.B.A.J. 690 (1974).
155. See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 720 n.7 (6th Cir.),petiion for cert.filed,
47 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (No. 78-1870); Oldham, supra note 154, at 692.




The Supreme Court's denial of certioriari in Daniel Construction in-
dicates that in at least one circuit, the Act does not embrace a right to
refuse unsafe work. The Whirlpool decision, which creates a split
among the circuits, presents another opportunity for the Court to recog-
nize this potentially life-preserving right. Supreme Court approval of
Whirlpool would be an important step in effectuating the congressional
purpose of assuring "safe and healthful working conditions and...
preserv[ing] our human resources."'' 57 In the event that the Court ap-
proves the Daniel Construction result, Congress should clarify its intent
and expressly recognize the right to refuse hazardous work.
Steven B. Feirman
As this Note went topress, the Supreme Court granted certiorari n Marshall
v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F2d 715, cert. granted, 48 U.S.L W 3188 (U.S.
Oct. 2, 1979) (No. 78-1870).
157. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
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